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NOTES
IMPROVEMENTS BY A TENANT AS REALIZED INCOME
TO THE LANDLORD
In 1919, for the first time, a United States Circuit Court of
Appeals was called upon to decide whether a lessor realized
taxable income upon repossession of his property after a lessee
had made improvements thereon at his own expense.1 Since then
there has been wide difference of opinion as to when, if ever,
a lessor realizes income as the result of improvements made by
the lessee. The Board of Tax Appeals and the lower Federal
Courts have decided a number of cases involving the problem,
often basing their decisions on factors and circumstances given
very little consideration in previous or subsequent cases. Not
until recently was the question decided by the Supreme Court
of the United States2 and that court's opinion lends little aid
in attempting a correct solution of this much unsettled question.
Probably the most important issue is as to the constitution-
ality of the regulations of the Treasury Department promul-
gated under the various revenue acts since the adoption of the
Sixteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. That Amend-
ment provides:
The congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes
on incomes, from whatever source derived, without appor-
1. Miller v. Gearin (C. C. A. 9, 1919) 258 Fed. 225, cert. denied (1919)
250 U. S. 667.
2. M. E. Blatt Co. v. United States (1938) 305 U. S. 267.
19391 NOTES
Washington University Open Scholarship
564 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 24
tionment among the several states, and without regard to
any census or enumeration.
The broad language of this amendment would seem to enable
Congress to pass laws taxing income almost without limit except
as regards the safeguards of fundamental rights protected by
other clauses of the constitution such as "due process" and
"equal protection. ' 3 The Revenue Act of 1939,4 in so far as
it affects the question here involved, provides:
"Gross income" includes gains, profits, and income derived
from * * * sales or dealings in property, whether real or
personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest
in such property, * * * or gains or profits and income de-
rived from any source whatever ** *
The language is practically the same as that of previous acts
under which promulgations of the Treasury Department with
regard to the lessor's income were made. The latest promulga-
tions issued by the Treasury Department thereunder read as
follows:
If buildings are erected or improvements made by a lessee
and such buildings or improvements immediately become
the property of the lessor, as, for instance, if they are not
subject to removal by the lessee, the lessor may at his option
report the income therefrom upon any one of the following
bases:
(a) The lessor may report as income for the taxable year
in which such buildings or improvements are completed
their fair market value at the time of their completion.
(b) The lessor may report as income at the time when
such buildings or improvements are completed the fair
market value of such buildings or improvements subject
to the lease.
(c) The lessor may spread over the life of the lease the
estimated depreciated value of such buildings or improve-
ments at the expiration of the lease and report as income
for each year of the lease an aliquot part thereof.
Except in cases where the lessor has reported income
upon basis (a), if the lease is terminated so that the lessor
comes into possession or control of the property prior to
the time originally fixed for the expiration of the lease, the
lessor shall report income for the year in which the lease
is so terminated to the extent that the value of such build-
ings or improvements when he becomes entitled to such
possession exceeds the amount already reported as income
3. Irwin v. Gavit (1925) 268 U. S. 161; Brushaber v. Union Pac. R. R.
(1916) 240 U. S. 1.
4. (1939) 1 U. S. Code Current Serv. 19, sec. 22(a).
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on account of the erection of such buildings or improve-
ments. No appreciation in value due to causes other than
the termination of the lease shall be included.
If the buildings or improvements are destroyed prior to
the expiration of the lease, the lessor is entitled to deduct
as a loss for the year when such destruction takes place the
amount previously reported as income because of the erec-
tion of such buildings or improvements, less proper adjust-
ment for depreciation in case option (a) is exercised, and
less any salvage value subject to the lease to the extent that
such loss is not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.,
Upon the face of the Regulations it does not appear that they
violate any constitutional rights of the taxpayer. It would seem
that if Congress should pass a revenue act providing that im-
provements by a lessee should constitute taxable income to the
lessor, either upon completion of the improvements or upon
termination of the lease, the courts would not be likely to con-
strue the language of the Sixteenth Amendment so narrowly
as to hold such a statute invalid if a practical method of admin-
istration could be found.6
It is submitted, therefore, that it would be quite logical to
call such improvements income,1 and some lower Federal court
decisions have been cited as holding that improvements do con-
stitute income at the time they are completed. 8 It should be
noted, however, that in Miller v. Gearin' and Cryan v. Wardell,10
such a statement was not necessary to the decisions and there-
fore it would seem that those cases are not authority for that
proposition. 12 In United States v. Boston & Providence R. R.,2
5. U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, art. 22(a)-13, approved 1939, promulgated
under the Rev. Act of 1938.
6. A study of the cases shows that taxpayers have seldom attacked the
constitutionality of the regulations, but have generally found fault with
the valuations placed upon the property and the methods used by the
commissioner in computing the tax.
7. Hewitt Realty Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev. (C. C. A. 2, 1935) 76 F. (2d)
880, 98 A. L. R. 1201.
8. Crane v. Comm'r of Int. Rev. (C. C. A. 1, 1934) 68 F. (2d) 640;
Kentucky Block Coal Co. v. Lucas (D. C. W. D. Ky. 1933) 4 F. Supp. 266;
United States v. Boston & P. R. R. (C. C. A. 1, 1930) 37 F. (2d) 670;
Cryan v. Wardell (D. C. N. D. Cal. 1920) 263 Fed. 248; Miller v. Gearin
(C. C. A. 9, 1919) 258 Fed. 225, cert. denied (1919) 250 U. S. 667; cf.
Austin, Are Leasehold Improvements Income? (1934) 12 Tax Mag. 469.
9. (C. C. A. 9, 1919) 258 Fed. 225, cert. denied (1919) 250 U. S. 667.
10. (D. C. N. D. Cal. 1920) 263 Fed. 248.
11. Julian B. Hart (1938) 37 B. T. A. 360, nonacquiescence (1938)
XVII-1 Cum. BulL 44; Hilgenberg v. United States (D. C. D. Md. 1937) 21
F. Supp. 453; Staples v. United States (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1937) 21 F. Supp.
737; Hand, J., in Hewitt Realty Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev. (C. C. A. 2,
1935) 76 F. (2d) 880, 98 A. L. R. 1201; also Comment (1935) 30 Ill. L.
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the statement is dictum and the Kentucky Block Coal case's
cites no authority for its holding. But logic is not the sole test
of constitutionality; the courts also consider practical problems
of administration. 1 The more recent cases have held that such
improvements are not realized income within the meaning of
the Sixteenth Amendment until the property has been sold or*
exchanged.25 One recent case, on the other hand, affirmed a
Board of Tax Appeals decision holding that the lessor did re-
alize income when improvements were made, 6 but in that case
the petitioner failed to overcome the presumption of correct-
ness of the commissioner's finding. The Hewitt Realty Co. case'
was first to hold that the regulations were unconstitutional, and
this was followed by Hilgenberg v. United States,28 Staples V.
United States,29 and English v. Bitgood,20 Campbell v. United
States2" being decided contra. The Board of Tax Appeals, how-
Rev. 392; Austin, Are Leasehold Improvements Income? (1934) 12 Tax
Mag. 469; Note (1921) 6 ST. Louis LAW R'viEw 26.
12. (C. C. A. 1, 1930) 37 F. (2d) 670.
13. Kentucky Block Coal Co. v. Lucas (D. C. W. D. Ky. 1933) 4 F. Supp.
266.
14. Magill, Taxable Income (1936) 20, where the author says, ** * It
is obvious, of course, that for tax purposes income must be determined in
some single unit of measurement, and that the money of the particular
country is regularly employed as such a unit. * * * Since an estimate of
value has an extremely subjective character, being simply a summary of
some person's ideas with respect to the probable selling price or income-
producing capacity of the particular object, it is clear, as already stated,
that courts and legislatures will tend to avoid such estimates so far as
possible. This tendency leads to the limitation of the recognition of income
for tax purposes to receipts either in money or susceptible 'of easy valua-
tion therein. From a purely practical point of view, therefore, courts arejustified in considering the form of the receipt, although it should always
be recognized that this problem is merely one of measurement, and not
one of the existence of income itself." See also Comment (1935) 35 Col. L.
Rev. 1320, on the majority opinion in the Hewitt case; Comment (1936)
20 Minn. L. Rev. 320.
15. English v. Bitgood (D. C. D. Conn. 1938) 21 F. Supp. 641; Fifteenth
Street Inv. Co. v. Nicholas (D. C. D. Colo. 1938) 23 F. Supp. 863; Hilgen-
berg v. United States (D. C. D. Md. 1937) 21 F. Supp. 453; Staples v.
United States (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1937) 21 F. Supp. 737; Hewitt Realty Co.
v. Comm'r of Int. Rev. (C. C. A. 2, 1935) 76 F. (2d) 880, 98 A. L. R. 1201.
16. Campbell v. United States (D. C. Terr. of Hawaii 1938) 1 Prentice-
Hall 1938 Fed. Tax Serv. par. 2201.
17. Hewitt Realty Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev. (C. C. A. 2, 1935) 76 F.(2d) 880, 98 A. L. R. 1201.
18. (D. C. D. Md. 1937) 21 F. Supp. 453.
19. (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1937) 21 F. Supp. 737.
20. (D. C. D. Conn. 1938) 21 F. Supp. 641; see also Fifteenth Street Inv.
Co. v. Nicholas (D. C. D. Colo. 1938) 23 F. Supp. 863.
21. (D. C. Terr. of Hawaii 1938) 1 Prentice-Hall 1938 Fed. Tax Serv.
par. 2201. In Everett Dominick v. United States (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1938)
1 Prentice-Hall 1938 Fed. Tax Serv. par. 5.533, the court indicated that
the Hewitt case may have been intended to be limited to the life of the
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ever, refused 22 to follow the Hewitt case, and, until the decision
by the Supreme Court in the Blatt case,'23 continued to hold that
the lessor did realize income from such improvements. How-
ever, since the Blatt case, the Board has taken the position that
the Regulations are invalid.2 ' In that case the petitioner leased
his building, which was to be remodelled by the lessee, for use
as a moving picture theater. Seats, draperies, and other equip-
ment were to be installed in the theater and were to become
property of the lessor at the termination of the lease. The com-
missioner, in accordance with the Regulations, determined the
depreciated value of the improvements at the end of the ten
year lease period and apportioned one-tenth of this as income
for each year of the term. The court held that the one-tenth
allotted to the first year did not constitute realized taxable gain
in that year. The Regulations 25 promulgated after the Blatt
case have not been changed, probably because the department
intends to make them the subject of special treatment.
The Hewitt case pointed out that while inseparable improve-
ments could logically be held income, they were not "realized"
income within the definition of "realized income" in Eisner v.
Macomber'6 and therefore are classed as capital accretions.2 7 In
the Macomber case the Court said:
The fundamental relation of "capital" to "income" has
been much discussed by economists, the former being likened
to the tree or the land, the latter to the fruit or the crop,
the former depicted as a reservoir supplied from springs,
lease, but in view of the language used the court felt itself constrained to
hold there was no income upon the termination of the lease.
22. Julia WilIms Sloan (1937) 36 B. T. A. 370, in which three members
of the board dissented; cf. Emma C. Morphy (1937) 35 B. T. A. 298, in
which four members of the board rendered a separate concurring opinion
favoring the holding of the majority in the Hewitt case.
23. M. E. Blatt Co. v. United States (1938) 305 U. S. 267.
24. Cleveland Trust Co. (1939) 39 B. T. A. (adv. op.) no. 18; Merkra
Holding Co., Inc. (1939) 39 B. T. A. (adv. op.) no. 19; William H. Kirk-
patrick (B. T. A. 1938) 1 Prentice-Hall 1939 Fed. Tax Service, par. 6.119.
25. U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, art. 22(a)-13, approved 1939, promulgated
under the Rev. Act of 1938.
26. (1920) 252 U. S. 189, 9 A. L. R. 1570.
27. For a good discussion concluding that such increment to value is
capital, see Austin, Are Leasehold Improvements Income? (1934) 12 Tax
Mag. 469. See also Note (1921) 6 ST. Louis LAw RaviEw 26; Develop-
ments in the Law (1934) 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1174, 1268. In the Blatt case
(1988) 305 U. S. 267, 278, the court said, "So far as concerns taxable income
the value of the improvements is not distinguishable from excess, if any
there may be, of value over cost of improvements made by lessor. Each
was an addition to capital; not income within the meaning of the statute."
It should be noted that this language in the Blatt case was dictum, and
Justice Stone in his separate concurring opinion disagreed with this part
of the decision.
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the latter as the outlet stream, to be measured by its flow
during a period of time. * * *28
In defining income the Court says:
"the gain-derived-from-capital" * * * Here we have the
essential matter: not a gain accruing to capital, not a
growth or increment of value in the investment; but a gain,
a profit from the capital however invested or employed and
coming in, being "derived," that is, received or drawn by the
recipient [the taxpayer] for his separate use, benefit and
disposal;-that is income derived from property. Nothing
else answers the description.29
Thus the definition in Eisner v. Macomber seems to place strong
emphasis on "separation" of income from capital. Similar em-
phasis was placed upon the "separation" idea in the Hewitt case
and cases following it; and notably in the Blatt case in which
the Supreme Court said:
It does not appear that if detached from the building they
[the fixtures] would have any value * * * [at the end of
ten years]. If any value is to be attributed to them as of
that time, it is included in and not separable from that of
the leased premises.30
It is generally agreed that if improvements are separable so as to
remain property of the lessee, the lessor receives income there-
from only if the lessee abandons them or whenever the lessor ac-
tually acquires them.31 In the Hewitt case, Hand, J., does not say
whether they are realized income when the lease is made or
when the term ends.3 2 However, the question of separation was
28. (1920) 252 U. S. 189, 206.
29. 252 U. S. at 207.
30. (1938) 305 U. S. 267, 278.
31. Kentucky Block Coal Co. v. Lucas (D. C. W. D. Ky. 1933) 4 F. Supp.
266. In this case the lessee made improvements to miners' houses which
became an integral part of the realty, and also installed a locomotive and
tracks in the mine which were removable chattels. The court held that the
improvements to the houses became property of the lessor in 1919 when
they were completed, and the lessor was charged with their value as income
in 1919. However, the court held the locomotive and rails did not become
property of the lessor until they were surrendered to him at termination
of the lease in 1920, and therefore they could not be taxed as income to the
lessor in 1919. To the same effect is G. C. M. 9755 (1931) X-2 Cune. Bull.
120.
32. In United States v. Boston & Providence R. R. (C. C. A. 1, 1930)
37 F. (2d) 670, the court held that the assumption on an obligation by the
lessee to discharge the funded debt of the lessor was income to the lessor
when the lease was signed. O'Day Inv. Co. (1928) 13 B. T. A. 1230, held
that a $20,000 advance payment of rent was income in the year it was
received. Cf. Federal Street &. P. V. Passenger Ry. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev.(C. C. A. 3, 1936) 84 F. (2d) 972, holding that assumption of a mortgage
due in forty-six years was not income to the assignor until paid and should
not be prorated over the forty-six year period.
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not there involved. It is with buildings or improvements, which
by their nature, become an inseparable part of the realty to
which they attach, that the chief difficulty arises.
It should be noted that the Supreme Court has recently de-
parted materially from the idea of "separation" as a test for
determining when income is realized in stock dividend cases. In
Helvering v. Goivran,33 a preferred stockholder received a divi-
dend of common stock which he sold back to the corporation at
par value. The stockholder contended this was a sale of capital
assets and should not be taxed as income. The court, however,
held that the dividend was income within the meaning of the
Sixteenth Amendment and the proceeds were taxed accordingly.
Other cases have held that in order to constitute income under
the Sixteenth Amendment property received need not necessarily
be separately disposableA4 In Cullinan v. Walker, 5 a Texas
corporation with capital stock of the par value of $100,000 was
reorganized and its assets were transferred equally to two new
corporations which were formed. Cullinan owned 26.64 per cent
of the stock of the old corporation for which he had paid $26,640.
A holding company was then formed to which was transferred
all the stock of the two new corporations. Stock of the holding
company and bonds of the two new corporations were dis-
tributed pro rata among stockholders of the old corporation. The
new corporations had no assets other than those received upon
liquidation of the old. Cullinan received securities of the aggre-
gate value of $1,598,400 as his pro rata share. The court held
that when the trustees in liquidation distributed the securities
in the three new corporations, Cullinan realized his gain and
it became taxable income. It has also been suggested that the
true basis for determining income is the nature of the trans-
actions6 and not the nature of the property or the use to which
it may be put. The Supreme Court in Peabody v. Eisner"T held
that receipt of property may constitute taxable income. The
33. (1937) 302 U. S. 238; Koshland v. Helvering (1936) 298 U. S. 441,
105 A. L. R. 756; Note (1936) 105 A. L. R. 761. For an analysis of the
"separation" test in stock dividend casessee Note (1938) 51 Harv. L. Rev.
702. Note (1932) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1072, discusses the limitations on Eisner
v. Macomber and points out that the court has apparently abandoned any
"definitive concept of taxable income."
34. Cullinan v. Walker (1923) 262 U. S. 134; cf. United States v. Phellis
(1921) 257 U. S. 156; Rockefeller v. United States (1921) 257 U. S. 176.
35. (1923) 262 U. S. 134.
36. Magill, Taxable Income (1936) 204 ff.; Comment (1935) 30 Ill. L.
Rev. 392; Comment (1935) 35 Col. L. Rev. 1320; Rottschaefer, The Con-
cept of Income in Federal Taxation (1929) 13 Minn. L. Rev. 637, 670,
where the author also discusses subsidies.
37. (1918) 247 U. S. 347.
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receipt of stock in payment for services has also been held
taxable income.8
Generally the idea that improvements are accretions to capital
rather than income is based on an analogy to increment in value
of property resulting from growth of the surrounding neighbor-
hood, or increase in value of a share of stock. 9 In case of im-
provements by a lessee, however, increase in value does not
result from growth of the neighborhood or the gradual increase
of a share of stock, but is a result of the acquisition of a physical
tangible asset which comes into the hands of the lessor as the
result of his business transaction with the lessee.
Upon this analysis it seems clear that there is no clash between
the Regulations and the Sixteenth Amendment, nor were the
courts shackled by precedent to hold that a denomination of
improvements as income was unconstitutional. 40 It is believed
that the distinction between improvements by lessees and other
types of increment to value of property as pointed out above
would justify a holding that improvements to land may be in-
come. This brings us to the real reason behind the courts' hold-
ings that improvements by the lessee do not constitute realized
income to the lessor until sold, viz., that of practicability. In
cases so holding the courts have emphasized the difficulties en-
countered in valuation and collection under Regulations similar
to those now in effect. It is submitted therefore that the Blatt
case might possibly have been decided differently had the ques-
tion arisen under different circumstances,4 1 or had there been
38. Salvage v. Comm'r of Int. Rev. (C. C. A. 2, 1935) 76 F. (2d) 112;
Robinson v. Comm'r of Int. Rev. (C. C. A. 6, 1932) 59 F. (2d) 1008. G. C.
M. 5866 (1929) VII-1 Cum. Bull. 200, held that the lessor received taxable
income from payment by the lessee of a special assessment for constructing
a highway. Terre Haute Electric Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev. (1933) 67 F.
(2d) 697, held that where the lessee paid taxes in accordance with a provi-
sion in the lease, the lessor received income in the year in which the obliga-
tion arose.
39. Hewitt Realty Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev. (C. C. A. 2, 1935) 76 F.
(2d) 880, 98 A. L. R. 1201. See also, Austin, Are Leasehold Improvements
Income? (1934) 12 Tax Mag. 469.
40. Poe v. Seaborn (1930) 292 U. S. 101, held that constitutional re-
quirements as to the receipt of income are satisfied if the taxpayer has
become the owner of property the value of which represents the gain, and
that it is properly accountable as income though the owner's possession and
use is postponed; cf. Huggitt v. Burnet (1933) 64 F. (2d) 705, which In-
volved gains from sales of stock by a legatee taking a vested remainder on
the death of testatrix. The court held the gain was determinable on the
basis of the fair market value of the stock at the time of testatrix' death
in 1912 or on the date set by law, whichever was greater, and not the value
at the date of distribution or death of the life tenant.
41. In the Blatt case (1938) 305 U. S. 267, the government contended
that if it is assumed that improvements made by lessee which will outlast
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a satisfactory method of fairly ascertaining the amount of
income., 2
If it is not a violation of the constitution to call improvements
income, when is income realized and how should it be returned?
An analysis of the Regulations, the constitutionality of which
is questioned, suggests a classification of the cases into two
groups: (1) where the improvements materially enhance the
value of the realty to such an extent that their value will outlast
the lease, in which case the lessor naturally expects to realize
some benefit therefrom; and (2) where the improvements are
such or the term of the lease is so long that any material en-
hancement in the value of the property will disappear before
the term has run, but where for some reason the lease is termi-
nated or forfeited before expiration of the named term and the
lessor comes into possession of valuable improvements which he
never expected to receive.
The statute, though frequently repassed and though amended
materially in other phases, has remained substantially the same
so far as it affects the problem here involved. Despite simi-
larity of the statutes the policy of the Treasury Department,
as evidenced by its Regulations, has fluctuated in what was,
perhaps, an unwise attempt to follow too closely the courts'
the term constitute income to the lessor at some time, the question is
whether such income is realized upon (1) completion of the improvements,(2) termination of the lease, or (3) disposition of the improved property,
and that the "soundest theory seems to be that such income is taxable at
the time the improvements are erected." The Court said, "We are not called
on to decide whether under any circumstances income is received by lessor
by reason of improvements made by lessee, nor to choose, for general ap-
proval or condemnation, any of the theories expounded by the United
States. Concretely, the question presented is whether, under the lease here
involved, one-tenth of what the commissioner and taxpayer call and agree
to be 'estimated depreciated value,' as of the end of the term, was income
to petitioner in the first year of the term." 305 U. S. at 276.
42. (1988) 805 U. S. 267, 278, the Court said, "The findings fail to
disclose any basis of value on which to lay an income tax or the time of
realization of taxable gain, if any there was. The figures made by the
commissioner are not defined. The findings do not show whether they are
intended to represent value of improvements if removed or the amount
attributable to them as a part of the building.
"* * * present or future value, however, ascertained, is single in sub-
stance- it cannot be arrived at by mere summation of actual or estimated
cost o constituent elements, new or depreciated. The addition to value of
the leased premises resulting from the lessee's improvements may not be
arrived at by formula or arithmetically by merely setting against each
item or element its cost less depreciation estimated to accrue during the
term of the lease. The amount included in the total value of the structure
reasonably to be attributed to the improvements after use for ten years
is not ascertainable by the simple calculation employed by the commis-
sioner."
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decisions. At first, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
treated improvements as income to the lessor to the extent of
their fair market value at the termination of the lease.'3 The
decision in Miller v. Gearin," however, was against the Regu-
lations of the Treasury Department. In the Miller case the
lessor, in 1907, leased premises for a term of 23 years. In
accordance with the lease contract, the lessee erected a new
building completed in 1907. In 1916 the lessee defaulted and
the lessor repossessed the property. The collector accordingly
assessed the lessor for the value of the building in 1916 as
income for that year. The Circuit Court of Appeals, however,
held that the lessor acquired nothing in 1916 except possession
of that which for many years had been her own, and posses-
sion so acquired was not income. The court further stated that
assuming the building was income it was "derived" when the
completed building was added to the realty. Following the Mille),
case, a Federal District Court decided Cryan v. Wardell,45 in
which also the lessee had erected a building as required in the
lease. The building was completed in 1910 and the lease was
for a term of 26 years. The lessor repossessed the property
in 1916 and the value of the building was assessed against him
as income for that year. The court held the lessor received no
income in 1916 and any accession of value accrued in 1910
when the building was completed.
After denial of certiorari in the Miller case, 0 the Regulations
were changed' 7 so that the lessor was considered to receive in-
come at the time improvements were completed, to the extent
of the fair market value thereof subject to the lease. These new
Regulations also contained suitable provisions for adjustment
in the event the improvements were destroyed, or if the lessor
obtained possession before the term expired. There was no es-
43. T. D. 2135 (1917) 19 T. D. Int. Rev. Laws 25; T. D. 2442 (1917) 19
T. D. Int. Rev. Laws 26; U. S. Treas. Reg. 53, art. 4, approved 1917, pro-
mulgated under the Rev. Act of 1916, as amended 1917; and, to the same
effect, U. T. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 48, approved 1918, promulgated under
the Rev. Act of 1918.
44. (C. C. A. 9, 1919) 258 Fed. 225.
45. (D. C. N. D. Cal. 1920) 263 Fed. 248.
46. (1919) 250 U. S. 667. The Blatt case does not cite either Miller v.
Gearin or Cryan v. Wardell, and whether the Supreme Court would agree
with them if a similar question were presented is a matter of conjecture.
See quotation from the Blatt case, supra, note 41.
47. U. T. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 48, approved 1929, promulgated under the
Rev. Act of 1918, as amended by T. D. 3062 (1920) 111-2 Cum. Bull. 199.
See Note (1921) 6 ST. Louis LAW Rinw 26, which concludes that these
Regulations are invalid because the method of valuation of the income was
speculative and impractical.
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sential change until Regulations 62, Article 48, 4 were approved,
under which an alternative method of returning income was
first provided. The taxpayer could either return the fair market
value of the improvements subject to the lease as income in
the year in which such improvements were annexed to the
property, or he could divide such value by the number of years
which the lease had to run and return an aliquot part in each
year, thus spreading the income over the term of the lease.49
No material changes were made in the Regulations on this point
until the approval of Regulations 86, Article 22 (a)-13.50 The
former Regulations"' provided that the lessor received income
when improvements were made "in pursuance of an agree-
ment with the lessor." As a result it was the contention of
many taxpayers that improvements were not income under the
Regulations unless the lease required them to be made, and
that where they were optional or voluntary by the lessee they
were not income.5 2 In Regulations 86, Article 22 (a)-13, and
subsequent Regulations, including the most recent ones, 5 3 that
language has been omitted, making it clear that the depart-
ment meant to draw no distinction between improvements pro-
vided for in the lease and those voluntarily made by the lessee.-
It should be noted that both the Miller and Cryan decisions,
according to which the department altered its Regulations, were
cases in which improvements were completed before ratifica-
tion of the Sixteenth Amendment and any statements in them
indicating that income was actually received by the lessor upon
completion of the improvements were dicta. It is the opinion,
therefore, of most writers and a few courts that the Miller and
48. Approved 1922, promulgated under the Rev. Act. of 1922, amended
by T. D. 4280 (1929) VIII-2 Cum. Bull. 285.
49. G. C. M. 550 (1926) V-2 Cum. Bull. 155. It would seem that the pro-
vision for an alternative method of returning the income does not affect the
constitutionality of the Regulations. The situation cannot be improved by
having more than one horn to the dilemma. On the other hand, conditions
upon persons exercising the option would not make the regulations uncon-
stitutional because they are, in a sense, the price paid for the option. In
this connection note also that once it is established that there is a tax
liability, the courts will give a wide latitude to the time and method of
collection. Tappan v. Merchants' Nat. Bank (U. S. 1873 )19 Wall. 490;
Witherspoon v. Duncan (U. S. 1866) 4 Wall. 210.
50. Approved 1934, promulgated under the Rev. Act of 1934.
51. U. S. Treas. Reg. 77, art. 63, approved 1933, promulgated under the
Rev. Act of 1932.
52. Everett U. Crosby (1926) 4 B. T. A. 1147; Henry L Brown (1926)
4 B. T. A. 1129.
53. U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, art 22(a)-13, approved 1939, promulgated
under the Rev. Act of 1938.
54. G. C. M. 10969 (1932) XI-2 Cum. Bull. 64; W. H. Martin (1931)
24 B. T. A. 813.
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Cryan cases really only held that the lessor received no income
at the termination of the lease.25 In any event it seems clear
that under these cases it could never be held that the lessor
received income at the termination of the lease. However, in
Appeal of Gilbert Butler,56 the Board of Tax Appeals took a
contrary view and held that where a lease was to run during
the life of a mine so that at the natural termination of the lease
any tunnels, shafts, etc., which the lessee might build would
be valueless, the lessor received income to the extent of the
value of such development work in the mine when the lease
was prematurely terminated. After the Butler case the Regula-
tions were amended" to contain substantially the same language
as is found in the present Regulations, which provides:
Except in cases where the lessor has reported income
upon basis (a), if the lease is terminated so that the lessor
comes into possession or control of the property prior to
the time originally fixed for the expiration of the lease,
the lessor * * * derives income, to the extent that the value
thereof exceeds the amount already reported.
55. Julian B. Hart (1938) 37 B. T. A. 360, nonacquiescence (1938)
XVII-1 Cum. Bull. 44; Hilgenberg v. United States (D. C. D. Md. 1937)
21 F. Supp. 453; Hewitt Realty Co. v. Comn'r of Int. Rev. (C. C. A. 2, 1935)
76 F. (2d) 880, 98 A. L. R. 1201; Comment (1935) 30 Ill. L. Rev. 392;
Note (1921) 6 ST. Louis LAw Ravmw 26; Austin, Axe Leasehold Improve-
ments Income? (1934) 12 Tax Mag. 469, points out that the sole question
was whether the improvements were income when the lease was terminated.
The court was very careful in the Miller case (C. C. A. 9,1919) 258 Fed. 225,
226, to say, "assuming that the building was income derived from the use
of the property * * *." Likewise in the Cryan case (D. C. N. D. Cal. 1920)
263 Fed. 248, 249, the court was careful to say, "whatever accession of
value resulted * * *." In view of the circumstances this interpretation of
the Miller and Cryan cases seems more sound. However, there is an
abundance of authority to the contrary, Julia Willms Sloan (1937) 36
B. T. A. 370; Emma C. Morphy (1937) 35 B. T. A. 289; Louise C. Slack(1937) 35 B. T. A. 271; Hewitt Realty Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev. (C. C. A.
2, 1935) 76 F. (2d) 880, 98 A. L. R. 1201; G. C. M. 9755 (1931) X-2 Cum.
Bull. 120; United States v. Boston & P. R. R. (C. C. A. 1, 1930) 37 F. (2d)
670; Shelby D. Scott (1928) 9 B. T. A. 1219; Joseph L. B. Alexander (1928)
13 B. T. A. 1169. In the Blatt case (1938) 305 U. S. 267, 280, the Court
said: "But, assuming that at some time value of the improvements would
be income of the lessor, it cannot be reasonably assigned to the year in
which they were installed."
56. (1926) 4 B. T. A. 756.
57. U. S. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 48, approved 1921, promulgated under
the Rev. Act of 1918, amended by T. D. 4279 (1929) VIII-2 Cum. Bull.
286; U. S. Treas. Reg. 62, art. 48, approved 1922, promulgated under the
Rev. Act of 1921, amended by T. D. 4280 (1929) VIII-2 Cum. Bull. 285;
U. S. Treas. Reg. 65, art. 48, approved 1924, promulgated under the Rev.
Act. of 1924, amended by T. D. 4281 (1929) VIII-2 Cum. Bull. 244; U. S.
Treas. Reg. 69, art. 48, approved 1926, promulgated under the Rev. Act.
of 1926, amended by T. D. 4282 (1929) VIII-2 Cune. Bull. 82.
58. U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, art. 22(a)-13, approved 1939, promulgated
under the Rev. Act. of 1938 (italics supplied).
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The Butler case, though apparently inconsistent with the Miller
and Cryan decisions and the amended Regulations, was allowed
to stand until the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals in
Louise C. Slack,5 which overruled the Butler case.60 In the
Slack case the lease was for 99 years. The lessee erected a build-
ing which had an estimated life of from 40 to 50 years. Six
years after completion of the building the lease was terminated
and the lessor went into possession. The Board held that the
building would have had no value at the end of the 99 year
lease period and therefore he derived no income by reason of
the termination of the lease prior to the time originally fixed.6 1
A number of decisions in accord with the Slack case have been
handed down.2
In the light of these decisions it seems safe to conclude that
where the nature of improvements is such, or the lease is so
long, that they would have no material value at the end of the
term, the lessor definitely does not realize income upon pre-
mature termination of the lease by which he obtains possession
and enjoyment of valuable improvements which he did not
expect because they would have been valueless had the lease
59. (1937) 35 B. T. A. 271.
60. For a discussion of the situation before the Slack case (1937) 35
B. T. A. 271, see Austin, Are Leasehold Improvements Income? (1934) 12
Tax Mag. 469.
61. In the Blatt case there was no premature termination of the lease
and the decision throws no light on what the Court would hold in such
a case. In conjunction with this, the practicability of charging a lessor
with income at time of completion of improvements should be further
noted. Suppose a sixty year old lessor leases property for a forty year
term. Assuming that the lessee makes improvements which will still be
valuable at the end of forty years, may the lessor reasonably expect to
derive benefits therefrom during his lifetime? In Birdie Parr Marshall v.
Seldon R. Glenn (D. C. W. D. Ky. 1939) 1 Prentice-Hall 1939 Fed. Tax
Serm. par. 5.252, the lessor was past seventy years of age and the lease
still had thirty years to run; cf. Nicollet Associates Inc. (1938) 37 B. T. A.
350.
62. F. S. Stimson Corp. (1938) 38 B. T. A. (adv. op.) no. 43, in which
the Slack case is expressly followed; Durdheimer Inv. Co. (1937) 36 B. T. A.
428; Myer Dana (1934) 30 B. T. A. 83. In Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co.(1937) 36 B. T. A. 1122, the lessor leased its plant under a 99 year lease
which required the lessee to make repairs, to pay for renewals and replace-
ments, and to make expenditures for additions and betterments, the value
of which greatly exceeded losses resulting from depreciation. Held, lessor
was not entitled to deduction for depreciation in the taxable year 1923-1925.
Although the value of additions greatly exceeded depreciation, the Board
did not hold that the lessor realized income. The question of income seems
not to have been raised by the Commissioner, probably because the lease
was for 99 years during which time all additions and betterments would
have become valueless, and probably would have been replaced several
times; cf. Boca Ratone Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev. (C. C. A. 3, 1936) 86 F.(2d) 9; Eggerman Inv. Co. (1937) 36 B. T. A. 1196.
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run its regular term. However, under the latest Regulations 3
and the last mentioned decisions, there seems to be a single
exception to what seems to this writer to be the correct inter-
pretation of the Cryan and Miller decisions. That exception
occurs where the nature of the improvements is such, or the
term of the lease is so short, that the lessor would obtain pos-
session of valuable increment to his property at the natural
expiration of the lease.
Under the provisions of present Regulations it is apparent
that where a taxpayer elects to report income upon basis (b)
or (c) " and the improvements would have value at the natural
termination of the lease, and the lease is prematurely termi-
nated, the lessor receives taxable income in the year of termina-
tion in an amount equal to the difference between the amount
already reported and the fair market value of the improvements
at date of termination. This could apparently be avoided by
reporting income upon basis (a). This raises the question of
the consistency between the Regulations and the holdings there-
under, and the Miller and Cryan cases. 5 The Miller and Cryan
cases held that the lessor does not receive taxable income at
the termination of the lease. In both the Cryan and Miller
cases the terms of the leases were less than the probable life
of improvements and the leases were prematurely forfeited. The
court held there was no income at the time of forfeiture. The
Regulations therefore seem to put too narrow a construction
on the decisions of these two cases. A distinction based on
whether basis (a), or basis (b) or (c), is used for reporting
income is unjustifiable. Also, it seems illogical to distinguish
between cases where the lessor gets possession of valuable im-
provements which he would not have gotten had the lease not
been prematurely terminated, and cases where the lessor merely
receives improvements which he always expected to get while
they were still valuable, but which, because of premature termi-
nation of the lease, have a greater value when he comes into
possession than he had expected. It is submitted that in order
to be in harmony with Miller v. Gearin and Cryan v. Wardell,
63. U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, art 22(a)-13, approved 1939, promulgated
under the Rev. Act of 1938.
64. U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, art. 22(a)-13, approved 1939, promulgated
under the Rev. Act of 1938, quoted supra, p.
65. Note that while the latest Regulations were promulgated after the
Blatt case, it is not to be presumed that the Treasury Department intended
them to reflect the holding in that case. Probably the Regulations will be
amended and Article 22(a) -13, will be made the subject of special treatment
by the department.
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the Regulations should provide that the lessor does not realize
income upon the termination of the lease under any circum-
stances.
They, then, would leave two other possible times at which
the lessor could be considered as having realized income, viz.,
upon completion of improvements, or upon sale of the property.66
It cannot be disputed that the lessor does realize income upon
sale of the property.67 Therefore the only question disputed
under the present state of the Regulations is as to realization
of income at the time improvements are completed, or possibly
at the time of premature termination where the improvements
would have retained their value beyond natural expiration of
the lease.
Practically, this is a bad situation, for were it reversed, viz.,
if the lessor received no income upon erection of the improve-
ments, but did receive income upon termination of the lease,
the practical problems could be dealt with more easily. Prob-
lems in the administration of the tax as the Regulations now
stand revolve chiefly around the difficulty of computing the
future value of improvements.68 In determining future values
the courts are rightly reluctant to accept depreciation tables
which may prove incorrect by the passage of time or extraordi-
nary circumstances."9 This difficulty becomes most troublesome
when there is a renewal clause, for how can value at the end
of the lease be determined when it is not known how long the
lease may run?
Realizing the extreme difficulty presented in attempting to
administer the provisions of the Regulations in such a case, a
General Counsel's memorandum opinion"o was handed down
holding that the taxpayer derived no taxable income upon com-
pletion of the building and other improvements erected by the
66. When the property is sold, however, it is not the improvements them-
selves which constitute income, but the amount actually received over and
above the tax base. Thus a certain improvement may add $10,000 to the
value of the property, and may increase the selling price by $10,000, and
yet may not be taxable income if the amount received on sale does not
exceed the tax base.
67. M. E. Blatt Co. v. United States (1938) 305 U. S. 267; Hilgenberg v.
United States (D. C. D. Md. 1937) 21 F. Supp. 453; Hewitt Realty Co. v.
Comm'r of Int. Rev. (C. C. A. 2, 1935) 76 F. (2d) 880, 98 A. L. R. 1201.
68. M. E. Blatt Co. v. United States (1938) 305 U. S. 267. See the dis-
senting opinion of Arundell in Emma C. Morphy (1937) 35 B. T. A. 289;
Hewitt Realty Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev. (C. C. A. 2, 1935) 76 F. (2d)
880, 98 A. L. R. 1201.
69. Comment (1938) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1113; cf. Burnet v. Logan (1931)
283 U. S. 404.
70. G. C. M. 6982 (1929) VIII-2 Cum. Bull. 190.
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lessee where the lease contained an option for three renewals.7 1
It should be noted here that in the facts there considered, the
lease provided that the title to the building and improvements
should remain in the lessee until termination of the lease. How-
ever, a similar agreement was involved in the case of Joseph
Alexander,2 decided prior to the above memorandum opinion,
and the Board of Tax Appeals held that the building became
part of the realty, title vested immediately in the lessor, and
the oral agreement was not considered sufficient to divest the
lessor of such title.7- In the Cataract Ice (o. case,"" the lease was
for five years with a renewal option. The Commissioner deter-
mined the value of the building at the end of the five year
period and apportioned it as income over each of the five years.
The Board of Tax Appeals upheld the Commissioner's action,
but in that case the petitioner did not question the Commis-
sioner's prorating the value over the five year period, but con-
tended that it had received no income because obsolescence and
uniqueness would make the building valueless at termination of
the lease. In his separate concurring opinion in the Hewitt
case, Judge Chase held that value of the building at termina-
tion of the lease could not correctly be determined unless con-
sideration were given to the lessees right to renew.71 In the
case of Julian B. Hart76 the Board of Tax Appeals held that
Where the exercise of a renewal option would exhaust the useful
life of the building, the question of taxable income realized by
the lessor cannot be determined until the lessee decides whether
to renew under the option. The Board distinguished this case
71. In W. H. Martin (1931) 24 B. T. A. 813, there was no provision in
the lease as to how long it should run and the Board held the lessor received
income to the full value of the improvements when they were completed.
72. (1928) 13 B. T. A. 1169.
73. It is submitted that in speaking of the title the actual effect of all
the provisions of the lease should be considered and not merely a statement
between the parties. Cf. condemnation proceedings in which persons having
leasehold interests are considered owners within the meaning of condem-
nation statutes and entitled to a part of the compensation; Note (1934)
98 A. L. R. 254, 258.
74. (1931) 23 B. T. A. 654.
75. Cf. Bonwitt Teller and Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev. (C. C. A. 2, 1931)
53 F. (2d) 381; Millinery Center Building Corp. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev.
(C. C. A. 2, 1934) 73 F. (2d) 1007. In these cases the taxpayer was the
lessee. The leases contained renewal options, but the court held it was
error to extend beyond the initial term of the lease the period over which
exhaustion of its value as of March 1, 1913, was to be spread. The court
pointed out that the renewal privilege might never be exercised. Cooper,
Changes in Federal Tax laws and Important Recent Tax Rulings (1936)
14 Tax Mag. 135, 141, says the Bureau is following the Millinery Center
Building Corp. case, supra.
76. (1938) 37 B. T. A. 360.
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from the Morphy" and Sloan" cases, in which it expressly re-
fused to follow the Hewitt case, on the ground that no renewal
options were there involved. Thus, though the Board, even
before the decision of the Supreme Court in the Blatt case, had
insisted that the Regulations were valid yet it recognized the
difficulty of administration where renewal options were in-
volved and held they did not apply to such cases.79 This still
leaves the practical objection against making the lessor pay a
tax on a speculative estimate. The Hewitt case has been fol-
lowed by the lower Federal courts. Thus in English v. Bitgood,0
where the lease contained no renewal option, the court held that
the element of uncertainty brought about by the renewal option
is not present in the case at bar, but while that uncertainty
apparently had some influence on the decision [in the
Hewitt case] it was not the basic reason for the conclusion
reached, and I believe the decision would have been the
same if it had been absent.8 1
This opinion is cited by the Supreme Court in the Blatt case in
which also no renewal option was involved.
From time to time the Board and the courts have considered
other factors as important in determining whether improve-
ments constitute income before the sale of the property. In some
cases it is insisted that improvements are additional rents,'8 2 and
rent constitutes income regardless of what form it takes.,- It
has been suggested, however, that improvements are not rent, '
and in the Blatt case the Court said, "Even when required, im-
provements by lessee will not be deemed rent unless intention
that they shall be is plainly disclosed.""5 Then quoting from
Duffy v. Central R. R.,8" the Court said:
[rent is] "a fixed sum, or property amounting to a fixed
77. Emma C. Morphy (1937) 35 B. T. A. 289.
78. Julia Willms Sloan (1937) 36 B. T. A. 370.
79. The Court of Claims in the Blatt case (1938) 87 Ct. Cl. 413, 23
F. Supp. 461, distinguishes the Hewitt case because of the presence of a
renewal option in the latter. In the Blatt case the lease contained no
renewal option.
80. (D. C. D. Conn. 1938) 21 F. Supp. 641.
81. 21 F. Supp. at 643.
82. Maurice Cross (1931) 24 B. T. A. 1079.
83. See supra, note 38.
84. Austin, Are Leasehold Improvements Income? (1934) 12 Tax Mag.
469, states that improvements do not come within the economists' definition
of rent and that following the theory to its logical conclusion "would always
result in a balance of rent to take into income upon a premature termina-
tion of the lease." This result would be contrary to the Miller and Cryan
cases, which held that there can be no income upon forfeiture.
85. (1938) 305 U. S. 267, 277.
86. (1925) 268 U. S. 55, 63.
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sum, to be paid at stated times for the use of property;
* * * it does not include payments, uncertain both as to
amount and time, made for the cost of improvements * * ,.-87
It may be, under the particular facts of the Blatt case, and
especially since the Commissioner failed to prove values suffi-
ciently, that the decision would have been the same even though
improvements had specifically been called rent. However, in
view of the language in the Blatt case, it would seem that im-
provements would be considered income in a proper case where
circumstances were consistent with a clearly evidenced inten-
tion to pay rent by means of improvements, and where values
were clearly proved.
It would seem that practical objections, even where no re-
newal clause is involved, justify the courts' finding that the
present Regulations are unconstitutional. Of the three times at
which improvements by a lessee might conceivably become re-
alized income to the lessor, (1) at the time of the completion,
(2) at the termination of the lease, and (3) at time of sale
or exchange of the property, the first, -which has been adopted
by the Regulations, is most vulnerable to practical objections.
By holding that income is realized only when property is sold,
the courts have avoided the uncertainties inherent in determin-
ing the value of a certain improvement a given number of years
hence. That holding also avoids the problem of valuation of
improvements at the time the lease is terminated. However,
there is one difficulty with holding that income is realized only
when the property is sold or exchanged, namely, that it affords
opportunity for tax avoidance. Suppose, for example, that A
owns a tract of land upon one part of which there is a building
with a reasonable rental value of $10,000 per year. The other
part of the tract is vacant. A could lease the entire tract to a
contractor for two years upon the consideration that the con-
tractor erect a $20,000 house on the vacant part of the tract. In
two years A would get the land back with the $20,000 house.
Obviously A has been enriched by a $20,000 house, but under
the holding that he does not realize income therefrom until a
sale he could escape taxation if he did not sell the property.
Assuming the holding that income is realized only on sale
of the property to be objectionable on the above ground, and
that the courts are justified in holding that improvements cannot
be realized income at the time of completion on the ground that
the tax would be based on an indefinite estimate of future value,
the objections to holding that improvements constitute income
87. (1938) 305 U. S. 267, 277.
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at the termination of the lease should be considered. It is true
that the Miller and Cryan cases held the lessor derived no income
at the termination of the lease, but those are not decisions by
the Supreme Court of the United States. Neither of those cases
was cited in the Blatt case, and that they might not be followed
is indicated by the following language:
The leased property is capable of inventory and analysis
for the purpose of ascertaining original and estimated pres-
ent costs of its elements and other relevant facts as indica-
tions of worth to be taken into account in determining its
value, i. e., the money equivalent of the property as a whole.
But present or future value, however ascertained, is single
in substance; it cannot be arrived at by mere summation of
actual or estimated cost of constituent elements, new or
depreciated.88
Nowhere in the opinion did the court state that the lessor could
not realize income until there was a sale of the property. It is
believed that the real gist of the Blatt case is in the following
words:
The addition to value of the leased premises resulting
from the lessee's improvements may not be arrived at by
formula or arithmetically by merely setting against each
item or element its cost less depreciation estimated to accrue
during the term of the lease. The amount included in the
total value of the structure reasonably to be attributed to
the improvements after use for ten years is not ascertain-
able by the simple calculations employed by the commis-
sion.89
But, assuming that at some time value of the improve-
ments would be income of lessor, it cannot be reasonably
assigned to the year in which they were installed.90
It is possible, therefore, that the Supreme Court may uphold
a Regulation that the lessor derives income from improvements
either at the termination of the lease or upon a sale of the
property, whichever occurs first, and that such income be com-
puted by the excess, if any, of the amount received upon the sale,
or of the estimated value of the property at the end of the lease,
88. 205 U. S. at 278. That part of this quotation which states that
value, however ascertained, is single in substance, must probably be taken
as holding that in the process of such valuation the improvements should
not be considered separate and apart from the land or building to which
they attach, but the whole (land, buildings, and improvements) must be
considered as a unit. This means the procedure would be similar to that
followed where the property is sold. The tax would be based, not upon
the specific amount added by the improvements, but upon any excess of
the estimated value at the end of the lease term over and above the tax base.
89. Id. at 279.
90. Id. at 280.
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over and above the tax base. It is true that in cases where the
property is not sold this would involve the difficulty of estimating
the value at the end of the term,91 but at least it is free of the
hazards of estimating future values and depreciation. Also,
the question of income would not be affected by the question of
whether improvements are required by the terms of the lease.
Premature termination would present no particular difficulty.
Whether improvements were separable, or whether title remained
in the lessee, would present no problems. The valuation would in-
clude everything left on the land at the termination of the lease.
However, the doctrine that a mere increase in value, not consum-
mated by a sale or otherwise severed, does not constitute taxable
income may effectually prevent adoption of the solution outline
above. It would appear that at present the Board of Tax Appeals
is of opinion that such doctrine will prevent the outlined solu-
tion. Such a result would appear regrettable because on practical
grounds the solution outlined seems to this writer to be the
most logical way out of a difficult situation.92
WILBERT T. HOHLT.
91. In view of what the courts have allowed in the line of estimates in
some other tax problems it seems that this would not be a fatal objection.
Under the Income Tax law when property is sold the profit or income upon
which the tax is based is the difference between the selling price and cost
or estimated market value on March 1, 1913. It has also been suggested
that the fact that the lessor receives nothing separable and tangible which
he can sell in order to obtain the money with which to pay the tax is an
objection, but in a number of cases where the lessee paid taxes or assumed
an obligation of the lessor this objection was passed over without con-
sideration.
92. Cf. Revenue Act of 1932, 48 Stat. 694, (1935) 26 U. S. C. A. sec. 44
(d), which provides, "If an installment obligation is satisfied at other than
its face value a distributed, transmitted, sold or otherwise disposed of,
gain or loss shall result to the extent of the difference between the basis of
the obligation and (1) in case of satisfaction at other than face value or a
sale or exchange, the amount realized * * *." The court applied this provi-
sion in Boca Ratone Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev. (C. C. A. 3, 1936) 86 F.(2d) 9, in which land was sold on an installment contract. The taxpayer
purchased the land at a cost of $54,244 and the selling price was $78,750.
Had the contract been fulfilled a net gain of $24,506 would have been
realized by the taxpayer. The purchasers paid half the price and the tax-
payer made return of half the profit and paid tax thereon. Then the pur-
chasers defaulted and the taxpayer repossessed. Land values had dropped
so low that at repossession the land was worth less than its approximate
cost to the taxpayer at that time. The court held that the return of the
land was a satisfaction at other than face value and therefore the amount
realized was the amount paid under the contract, less taxes paid on the
profit previously reported, plus estimated value of the premises at time of
repossession, less original cost to the taxpayer. In Eggerman Inv.
Co. (1937) B. T. A. 1196, the purchaser made improvements under an
executory contract of sale and later defaulted. The Board followed the
Boca Ratone case, and the determination of taxable gain therefore involved
a determination of the fair market value of the property at the time of
repossession. These decisions were cited in Walter F. Haass (1938) 37
B. T. A. 948.
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